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Aristotle explains how the city develops naturally out of more scattered and
agriculturalwaysofliving,andcomparesthecitytoanorganicwhole,suggestingthat
the city is a natural entity. However, Aristotle also praises the person ‘who first
established’ the city (Pol 1.2.1253a30-31) and later compares this lawgiver to a
craftsman,2 giving evidence for the artificialness of the city and the importanceof
humanpracticalreasoninitsconstruction.
MyaiminthispaperistopresentaninterpretationofAristotle’saccountof
thecity that accommodatesbothperspectives. I argue that thecity is aproductof





indicates that it is a hybrid treatise, being part natural science and part political
science(justashisDe Anima ispartnaturalscienceandpartmetaphysics).3Natural
sciencepertainstothehumanbeingswhopossessanaturaldrivetowardsforming











1 For instance, Keyt 1991: 118 refers to this problem as ‘a blunder at the very root of Aristotle’s
politicalphilosophy.’SeealsoKraut2002:240-6,Mayhew1997:325-6andReeve2009:513-8.
2SeePol 2.8.1268b34-8;2.12.1273b30-3,1274b18-19;and7.4.1325b39-1326a5. 













similar tootherbiologicalfeaturesthatarenecessary for livingandwhicharealways a
realizationofapre-existingpotentialforform–aprocessthatIrefertoas‘primary
teleology’.Theethical city, however, is similar to thosebiological features that are
notstrictlyspeakingnecessaryforliving,butarerather‘for the better’ andaresaidtobe
forthesakeofliving well. Suchfeaturesaretheresultofgoal-directedagentsmaking
use ofwhat is already available for something good– a process that I refer to as
‘secondaryteleology’.4






Aristotle explicitly characterizes his investigations in theEthica Nicomachea and the
Politica aspartofoneand the samescience,namelypolitical science (see, e.g.,EN 
1.2.1094a26-b7 and 10.9). This political science is defined as the study of how to
makecitizens‘goodandcapableoffinedeeds’(see,e.g.,EN 1.9.1099b29-32andPol 
7.13.1332a7-38). Whereas the Ethica Nicomachea focuses on virtue, i.e., on what
constitutes a good state of character, and works predominantly at the level of
individual human beings, the Politica operates at the level of the highest form of
human community, and offers an investigation of the city and of particular
constitutions as themeans bywhich politiciansmake citizens good. Both provide
politicalknowledge,whichisthe‘mostauthoritativeandmostarchitectonic’formof
knowledge(EN 1.2.1094a26-b7)andbelong–accordingtoAristotle’scategorization
of the sciences in theMetaphysica (Meta 6.1 and 11.7) – to the branch of practical
sciences.
Althoughpoliticalscience is thusclearlyseparatedofffromnaturalscience,
which is a theoretical science, Aristotle’s Politica nevertheless contains at least three
biological features that appear to belong more properly to a treatise engaged in
naturalscience.ThefirstandmostproblematicofthesefeaturesisAristotle’squasi-

















reachedthe limitof total self-sufficiency so to say, andwhichcomestobe












havebynature:humans instinctively (andnotbychoice:Pol 1.2.1252a28-30) strive
towardsself-preservationandreproduction,andtendtolivetogetherandco-operate
insecuringthesegoals,evenwhentheyarenot inneedofanything(this iswhat it
means to be political: HA 1.1.487b33-488a13, EN 9.9.1169b16-19 and Pol 
3.6.1278b15-21). Inaddition, the smallest elementsof thecity (Pol 1.1.1252a18-23)
turnouttobe itsconditionallynecessaryparts (cf.Pol 1.2.1252a24-26):even ifone
findsAristotle’shistoricalaccountofthegenesisofcitiesnottobeterriblycompelling,
thebiologicalovertonesareundeniablypresent.
The city’s developmental account is followed by two other arguments,
exemplifyingthesecondandthirdbiologicalfeature.ThesecondoccursinAristotle’s
argumentthathumanbeingsaremore politicalthananyotherpoliticalanimal,onthe








The starting point of our investigation is achieved by positing [principles]
thatwe are accustomed constantly to use for our science of nature (πρὸς τὴν
µέθοδοντὴνφυσικήν),assumingthatthisisthewayinwhichthingsareinall






given that Aristotle typically prohibits the transfer (or metabasis) of scientific
principlesfromone(unrelated)sciencetoanother(APo 1.7.75a38-b6).However,its
occurrencehere does not seem tobe an accidental slip, asAristotle applies it two
more times in the Politica: first, in the establishment of war as a natural art of
acquisition (inPol 1.8.1256b15-22) and later, in thecharacterizationof ‘loveof the
self’ as a feeling in humanbeings that is implanted by nature,which explainswhy
humansvalueprivateproperty(inPol 2.5.1263a38-b3).Infact,thereareseveralmore
passages inthePolitica inwhichAristotleappliesprinciplesormethodsthatbelong
properly tothenatural sciences tohis analysisof (aspectsof) thecity.6Theuseof
teleologicalprinciplesandnaturalmethodsinthePolitica isthusquitepervasive.
The third biological feature occurs in Aristotle’s next argument, which
establishesthecity’snaturalprioritytothefamilyandthe individualontheground
thatawhole isnecessarilypriorto itspart(Pol I2,1253a18-20).Aristotlesupports
this claim by drawing an analogy with natural bodies and their parts (destroy the
body,andahandwillbeahandinnameonly,sinceitisnolongerabletoperformits
function), thus conceptualizing the city as an organism, and citizens as its
instruments(Pol 1.2.1253a20-6):

For once the whole is destroyed there will be no foot or hand, except
homonymously, in the sameway onewould speak about [a foot or hand]






6For instance, inPol 1.2.1252b1-5,Aristotlereferstotheprinciplethat ‘naturepreferstomakeone
thing foronepurpose’ inexplainingwhyhumanbeingsare sexuallydifferentiated,which is afairly







The analogy raises a number of interpretational problems, the most pressing of
whichisthequestionwhetherAristotlebelievesthatcities,notjustarebynature,but
also have a nature. That is, for something to qualify as a true natural entity for
Aristotle,itnotonlyneedstobeanatureinthesenseofbeingafinalcause(foreven
non-naturalentitiescanbeanatureinthatsense:seetheexampleofahouseinPol 




beingsofwhich theyarecomposed(inotherwords, ifAristotle’s analogybetween
citiesandorganisms is toobiological), thatwould implythatAristotleultimatelydoes
away with the ontological independence of ‘ordinary’ substantial beings such as
individualhumans. Itwouldalsoextendthe scopeofnatural teleology toan inter-
species or perhaps even cosmic level.7 And finally, it would contradict Aristotle’s
immediatelyfollowingappraisalof‘thepersonwhofirstputit[i.e.thecity]together
(ὁ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας)’ as responsible for one of the greatest goods (Pol 
1.2.1253a29-31),whichsuggeststhatpoliticiansarelikecraftsmen,andthatcitiesare





creates the city. Given these problems, scholars have sometimes suggested that
Aristotle’scharacterizationofthecityasnaturalmustbefalse,orthatitisonlymeant
to be read metaphorically,8 but the biological language is too strong to be just
explainedaway.

Before offering an alternative solution to these problems, letme explain why we
should take the biological features seriously as belonging to Aristotle’s study of
nature,herecarriedoutinthecontextofthePolitica,whichwouldthusbeahybrid
treatise.
The clearest indication that Aristotle is conducting natural science in the
Politica liesinhisuseoftheteleologicalprinciplethatnaturedoesnothinginvain.As
indicated above, all teleological principles belong properly and exclusively to the
science of nature (see IA 2.704b12-705a2, quoted above).9 The principles are
empirical hypotheses about the goal-directed actions of formal natures in the
productionofanimals(cf.GA 5.8.788b20-25andResp10.476a13):seeingthatnature








in vain. Aristotle frequently appeals to these ‘general rules’ or principles in his
biological treatises in cases where the causes of a given explanandum are not




either necessary or better’ (and thus by engaging in a kind of thought experiment
wherewepicturenature as agoal-directeddesignerof theanimal inquestion),we
might be able to discover for what reasonnature acted this way in this particular




the use of these principles is successful in generating natural explanations), those




Aristotle’s use of teleological principles in the De Caelo provides an





the fact that the heavenly domain is empirically underdetermined, whichmakes it
verydifficulttoprovidecausalexplanationsoftheheavenlymotionsandattributes.
Infact, thewholetreatise–eventhough it isexplicitly introducedasbeingpartof
 
10 For instance, in order to discover why snakes have no feet (which Aristotle considers to be a
paradoxicalabsenceofparts,giventhatsnakesarebloodedland-dwellersandallotheranimalsofthis
widerkinddohavefeet),Aristotlepositstheprinciplethatnaturedoesnothinginvainandengagesin
athoughtexperiment inwhichthenowabsentpartsare imaginedtobepresent(IA 8.708a9-20;cf.
PA 4.13.696a10-15).Thismentalpictureofthesnakeimmediatelyrevealsforwhatreasonnaturedid
notproducefourfeetintheanimal:given the disproportionate dimensions of the snake’s body,havingonlytwo
pairsoffeetsetadistancefromeachother(naturecannotgivethesnakemorethanfourfeet,because
thatwouldviolateitssubstantialbeingasabloodedanimal)wouldnotallowthesnaketobeableto











heavenly phenomena, all of which are generated through the application of
teleologicalprinciples.13Theprinciplethatnaturedoesnothing invain isusedfour
times in this treatise, each time for the discovery of the causes of absences of
heavenly phenomena. Aristotle points out that the teleological explanations he
ultimatelyprovidesarenotasnecessaryastheonesprovidedinthebiologicalworks,
but he insists that they are at least ‘plausible’ or ‘reasonable’.14 Given the lack of








18, the principle is used to find the explanation of why human beings are more 
politicalthanotherpoliticalanimals.Thecauseforthisdifferentiationturnsouttobe
a feature that belongs to the substantial being of (and is thus natural to) human
beings, but that is absent in the other political animals: whereas other political
animalsonlyhavethecapacityforvoice,humanbeingshavetheuniquecapacityfor
speech.15Aristotle reasons that, sincenaturedoesnothing invain, this capacity for
speechmustbeforthesakeofsomethingandenablehumansbeingstoliveakindof
political life that is different from those who merely possess voice (imagine the
presenceofspeech innon-politicalhumans,or imaginepoliticalanimalswithvoice
livingthesamekindofcommunallifeashumansdo:inbothcases,thepresenceof
speech in humans would be in vain). The purpose of speech in this context is
identifiedasthecommunicationofmoralconcepts,anditisthisabilitythatmakesus
more political thananyotherpoliticalspecies.16Granted, theteleologicalprinciple is
notusedhereasitisinthebiologicalworksinordertofindthecauseoftheabsence
of a part (its use for finding the cause of the presence of something is however
attestedintheDe Anima:see,e.g.,DA3.12.434a30-b8),buttheexplanationityields
picksout anatural causepertainingto thenatureofhumanbeings.Thetwoother
 















war are natural and just. InPol 2.5.1263a38-b3, the principle points to the natural
love of self humans have,which explainswhy they enjoy private possessions, and




application of teleological principles in the Politica are human beings and the










nature and uses them (ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ ποιεῖ ἡ πολιτική, ἀλλὰ
λαβοῦσα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρῆται αὐτοῖς), so too is it necessary thatnature
providesearthandseaandwhateverelseforfood.

Political sciencemakes useof the humans it receives fromnature and in that sense




Iamtalking,for instance,aboutaquantityofcitizensand land.For justas
for other craftsmen, such as theweaver or shipbuilder, it is necessary that
somematerialisavailablethatisfittingforthefunction(fortotheextentthat
it turns out to be better prepared, the thing that comes to be by art will
necessarily also be better), in the same way also is it necessary for the








10.9.1181b12-15; andPol 7.13.1333a16-b5, esp. 1333a37) that the lawgiver will be
abletochoosethemostsuitable‘materials’andmakethebestuseofthem.17
For thePolitica as a treatise, thismeans thatwe shoulddistinguishbetween
twolayers:a‘biological’layerpertainingtothenatural,constitutivematerialofcities
(i.e., the human beings and the communities they form by nature, without
interference of a lawgiver) and to which principles of the science of nature can
properly be applied, and an ‘ethical’ or ‘political’ layer pertaining the constitutions
andthelawgiverswhousehumanbeingsandtheirnaturalcommunitiestocreatethe
















whatdrivesthecoming into beingofthecityistherealizationofthefunctionof living,
presumably for all its inhabitants, including thewomen and slaves.This biological
goalistheprimaryfunctionofthedevelopmentofthis‘natural’city,18anditexplains
why all humans are invested in its realization. However, what accounts for its
continuedandstable existence is thefact that thecity (onceorganizedproperlybya
lawgiver)makespossibletherealizationofthefunctionof living well –ifonlyto its
freemalecitizens.Thisethicalgoalisthemostimportantandmostdefiningfunction
of the city (see Pol 3.6.1278b15-31; 1287b23: µάλιστα µὲν οὖν τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τέλος;
 
17 See also Pol 7.7.1327b18-1328a20, where Aristotle indicates that the lawgiver needs to have
knowledgeofthecharacterofthecitizenshechoosesforhiscity,sincethosewhoarebothintelligent
andcourageousintheirnaturewillbe“mosteasilyledtovirtue”(1327b36-38:εὐαγώγουςἔσεσθαι…




fromnature itself,i.e.,fromthetruth,byreferencetowhichtojudgewhatis justandwhat isgood













that are for the sakeof livingversus thosethat are forthe sakeof livingwell, and
differentiatesbetweenthecausesofthecomingtobeandtheexistenceoffeatures
only in a special type of case – distinctions an aspiring politician might well be
assumed to be familiar with. In theDe Partibus Animalium, for instance, Aristotle





of living a shorter or longer time (τοῦ ζῆν ἐλάττω ἢ πλείω χρόνον).…and






to be and exist due to a process I call ‘primary teleology’: they are the necessary
realizations of a pre-existing, internal potential for form, as specified by the
definitionof the substantialbeingof theanimal.Becauseof theirvitalor essential





Other parts, however, such as kidneys (PA 3.7.670b23-7) and horns (PA 
3.1.661b28-662a2) are not ‘among the necessities for living’ (see Aristotle’s
descriptionof limbs inPA 3.4.665b21-7;25-6:οὐκἔστιτῶνπρὸςτὸζῆνἀναγκαίων;
cf.GA 1.4.717a12-31ontestes),butareratherpresentforthesakeof‘thewelland
thegood’or ‘forthebetter’.Thesepartsareofasubsidiaryor ‘luxury’nature:they





horns provide protection – a function not mentioned in Aristotle’s list of soul-
functionsinhisDeAnima).Hypotheticallyspeaking,theformalnatureoftheanimal
couldhaverealizedallthevitalandessentialfunctionswithoutproducingsuchparts





by-productsof theprimary teleologicalprocesses andarethenusedbytheanimal’s
formalnaturefor(‘pros’or‘charin’ –Aristotleoftenuses‘weaker’teleologicallanguage
inthesecases)theproductionofpartsthatservetheanimal’swell-being.Thisisalso
why Aristotle distinguishes between the causes of the coming to be of these parts,
whichisusuallymaterialnecessity,andthecausesoftheirexistenceorpresence,whichis
afinalcauseofthesubsidiaryor luxurykind.Theprocess is teleological (itarethe
goal-directedactionsofthe formalnature inusing thesematerials that account for
thepart’s functional presence),but the function is imposedon the extramaterials
onlysecondarily totheir independentproductionand isrestrictedbythepotentials
thosematerialsofnecessityhave.
Aristotle lays the foundation for this distinction between features that are
necessary for living and those that are subsidiary to living well in the ‘biological




of living orbeingitself,orisratherforthesakeof livingwell orthe good (seeespecially
DA 3.12.434a22-6,b10-18andb22-27; 3.13.435b19-21).Inthefirstcase,Aristotle
believes that the realization of a certain capacity is of immediate vital or essential
importanceforallthesubspecieswithinthesamewidestformoflifeasconsideredin
De Anima, i.e., plants, non-human animals, and human beings. Without the
possessionofandthemeanstorealizethatcapacity,thelivingbeingcouldnotatall
haveexistedorhavebeen the specifickindofbeing it is.For instance,having the
capacityof touch isbothanecessary and sufficient condition forbeingananimal,





sense). However, their realization does serve the well-being of some of them: the







alreadypresent forthe sakeof cooling,naturecanuse it for a subsidiary function,












variability among those whose nature partakes not only of living but, in




capacities forbasic survival and reproduction; at the top are the living beings that
displayagreaterorganicandfunctionalcomplexity(inadditiontohavingallthebasic
capacities) and that thus partake in a form of living well.19 Human beings, as a
species,areat thetopofthisgradualscale: theyarethemostcomplexanimalsand
possess the highest soul-capacity, which is thought. All humans, therefore, are
capable of living as well as of livingwell in a biological sense, and – as Aristotle




therefore, human beings, even when they do not require help from each
other,nolessdesiretolivetogether…Buttheyalsocometogetherandhold 
together thepolitical community for the sake of life itself (τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεναὐτοῦ): for
perhapsthereis somepartofthegoodpresentalsoinwhatisinaccordance 










virtuous life in accordance to reason (see, e.g.,NE 1.4.1095a17-20,1.8.1098b20-22
and6.5.1140a24-28),isrestrictedtoaselectgroupofhumanbeings,namelytothose
whopossessan ‘authoritative’facultyofdeliberationand, inaddition,areeducated




(EN 2.1.1103a30-b5 and 10.9.1179b29-1180a5; Pol 7.13.1332a41-b11). Although
manyformsoflivingtogetherwillsufficeforthepreservationoflifeofallhumans,









in accordance with choice ... The end of the city is living well, and these
thingsareforitsend.Andthecityisthecommunityoffamiliesandvillages







 BASIC LEVEL  
(final cause is living/existing) 
COMPLEX LEVEL  
(final cause is living well/the good) 
Type of feature Necessary Beneficiary Subsidiary Beneficiary
Biologicalpart Liver,bladder Allbloodedanimals Kidneys,horns Someanimals
Soul-capacity Touch Allanimals Voice Someanimals






Just like allotherbiological features that arenecessary for living,Aristotle explains
thecomingtobeofthenaturalcity‘bottomup’–astheresultoftheformalnatures
ofhumanbeingsrealizingtheirowninternal,pre-existingpotentialforform,which
includes their political nature. The political community arises as an emergent










it with a constitution (cf. Pol 1.10.1258a21-4, quoted above). And, just as the
subsidiaryandluxurypartsmadefromextramaterialshelptheanimaltowhichthey
belongto livewell, so toodoes theethical city–ormoreprecisely: theextra time
(scholê) opened up for the pursuit of politics and philosophy21 –make a good life
possibletothoseforwhomthisispossible.Theethicalcityisthusaproductofart,
but of the kindof art that imitates the natural process of secondary teleology and
thatistherefore‘inaccordancetonature’(cf.Ps.-Arist.Econ1.2.1343a24-b1).22
The question of whether the city is a product of art or of nature thus
presents a false dichotomy. The teleological explanations Aristotle gives in his
accountofthecityindicatethatitisboth:thecityfirstcomesintobeingasaproduct
ofnaturalteleology,butitsexistenceforthesakeoflivingwellisaproductoftheart
of lawgiving in its imitation of the process of secondary teleology. The resulting
ethical city,which is theproperobjectofpolitical science, isnot arealizationof a
pre-existing,naturalpotential foracity-form(theformsofconstitutionsdifferand
areimposedthroughtheexternalgoal-directedactionsofalawgiver).Thecitydoes




priority to its individual inhabitants (inPol 1.2.1253a18-22),hedoesnot claim that





20 Think, for instance, of Athens before Solon, or of the way most barbarians live according to
Aristotle,orevenofthehierarchicalsocialstructuresanddivisionsoflabourthatcanbefoundinbee
hivesandantcolonies.
21 I thank Jim Hankinson for pointing out this analogy. For the importance of leisure, see Pol 
2.9.1269a34-36;2.12,1273a31-b7;and7.9.1329a1-2.
22Theroleofthelawgiverisinthatsensenotthatmuchdifferentfromthatofthefarmer:although









When thiswhole is destroyed, however, parts of animals do not evaporate outof
existence, but existmerely ‘asmatter’ and ‘as a heap’ (Meta 7.16.1040b5-10)25 and
remain strippedoftheiroriginal identity.Aneye isno longer aneye,butmerely a
heap of fluids and solids, referred to as an ‘eye’ only homonymously. Similarly,
humanbeings,whenseparatedfromwhatmustbetheethicalcity(thisisrevealedby
Aristotle’s reference to self-sufficiency inPol 1.2.1253a26, which is thepurpose of
the ethical city; cf. Pol 3.9.1280b29-35), are no longer able to perform their civil
function– they loose their self-sufficiency,which isnecessary,not for living,26but
for living well. The natural priority Aristotle refers to thus entails the functional 
dependencyof theparts tothewholeofwhichtheyarepart:withoutthecity,human
beings existmerely as ‘unorganized’matter and can no longer to be identified as
citizens(fortheidentificationofthecitizensaspartsofthecity,seePol 3.1.1274b38-
40) – theyhave lost the external conditionsnecessary for living a happy life (note
thattheycanstillbecalled‘humans’inanon-homonymousway).27Humansarenot





nature and political art. Humans form political communities by nature, but the
applicationofpoliticalartisnecessarytotakethisbiologicalwayoflifeinsupportof









27 For humans (but not for parts of a body) itmakes a huge difference whether or not they are
separatedfromtheethicalcity as agrouporby themselves.Anyhumanseparatedasan individual
fromtheethicalcitywillenduploosingatleastpartofwhatmakeshimhumanifheisalsonolonger
part of a natural city: a political animal needs to be with others – however few – to realize his
particularwayoflife.Ifseparatedfromtheethicalcityasagroup,ontheotherhand,humanscanstill
form a natural community (and attain a natural level of organization) that allows them to live and
realize their political way of life. For this group of humans, the citizens among them suffer the
greatestloss:theybecome‘mere’humansandloosetheircapacitytoliveahappylife,whereasforthe










of the natural inclinations and tendencies all human beings have, is the object of
naturalscience.Thecitythatexistsforthesakeoflivingwellandthatisestablished
by the lawgiver who uses the natural city as his material is the object of political
science. The Politica is mostly concerned with the latter, i.e., the ethical city, and
thereforeforms,togetherwiththeethicaltreatises,mostlyastudyinpoliticalscience.
However,where the ‘matter’of theethical city is at stake,Aristotle (as should the
lawgiver) approaches the inhabitants of the city as biological entities, and uses
principles that belong properly to the science of nature: the Politica also involves
discussions that are at home in the study of nature. This in turn provides an
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